News from the New Party

Pakistan's real emergency

Much of the justification for a liberal interventionist or neo-conservative foreign policy in the years following 9-11 has been predicated on the superiority of liberal democratic values and a determination to promote the spread of these values.  The natural corollary to this is that undemocratic regimes can only, at best, be temporary allies.

President Musharraf of Pakistan has therefore always been an uncomfortable ally in the War on Terror.  Whilst he has been frequently feted by Western leaders for his support of the West, he remains nevertheless a military autocrat.  His declaration of a state of emergency this week stands as a stark reminder of this fact.

Bill Roggio of the Weekly Standard reports:

In his address to the nation, Musharraf cited the rise in terrorist attacks, the creeping power of Pakistan's Supreme Court, and an economic downturn as the reasons for taking such drastic action. "Pakistan is on the verge of destabilization," Musharraf declared. But the reasoning behind Musharraf's imposition of a state of emergency is more likely due to his weakening political situation, not the rise of Islamist militancy in the country.

Musharraf's usurpation has weakened, not strengthened his ability to fight the dramatic rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda in the Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and elsewhere. National unity and political consensus is needed to fight the rising threat of militancy sweeping across Pakistan, yet the state of emergency has pushed Musharraf's potential political allies into the opposition, weakening support for the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Militarily, Musharraf has focused his energy on quelling the political opposition, which will detract from his ability to tackle the increasing radicalism. And to is unclear what effect, if any, the state of emergency will have on the sagging morale of the Pakistani military and police, which have performed poorly in the tribal areas of Waziristan and the settled district of Swat. Soldiers have been captured by the hundreds and surrendered or deserted by the dozens. The Taliban has beheaded well over a dozen soldiers and policemen. The Pakistani military also boasts an inordinately high number of Pashtuns in its security forces, many whom are sympathetic to the Islamists. Other Pakistani soldiers resent the thought of fighting what they perceive as an American war against their own citizens.

In terms of the War on Terror then, Musharraf has taken his eye off the ball.  Soldiers guarding the likes of Benazir Bhutto under house arrest are not rooting out al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Furthermore, the unpopularity of Musharraf's regime is such that it has doubtless increased still further Islamist support in the country.  Indeed, support for such ideas has been growing in Pakistan for a very long time - and corrupt civilian and military governments have done nothing to halt this trend.

Oliver Kamm comments:

Not till the 1970s did religious parties become prominent in Pakistan, when prime minister Zulkifar Ali Bhutto, in a shameless search for political allies, pushed through various measures to increase the influence of the parties Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and Jamiat-i-Islami in civil society. When the military ruler General Zia ul Haq deposed Bhutto in 1977, the precedent had been established, and monstrous acts of sharia "justice", including amputation of limbs, became commonplace. When democracy returned a decade later, nothing was done to arrest the growth of militant Islamic influence into politics and civil society: Benazir Bhutto even formed a coalition government with one of those extremist parties. And under all of these governments, the place of Islamist ideology in the education system has increased.

One thing that the Bush administration has apparently not realised, and has certainly not given sufficient weight to, is that since his seizure of power in 1999, General Musharraf has been far from a reliable opponent of terrorism. His regime has got far more out of its alliance with the US - in aid, debt relief and, most important and unprincipled, a softening of the accurate perception of Pakistan as a terrorist-supporting state - than the western alliance has got out of him. There have admittedly been successes in police operations against Islamist terrorist cells and our own police have benefited from these actions. Those terrorists have in almost every case been foreign cells: transplanted Islamists, rather than Pakistanis, which is where the real problem lies.

Back to the question of priorities. After 9/11, to have seen Musharraf as an autocrat whose removal was as urgent as Saddam Hussein's or the Taliban's would plainly have been unrealistic (if not entirely perverse). But to have invested faith - which seems the right term - in him as an ally against Islamist fanaticism is reminiscent of earlier American treatment of the Shah of Iran.

And we all know what happened to him.  It must now be generally accepted by Western governments that the recent actions of President Musharraf are beyond the pale, and that democratic institutions and the rule of law should be re-established in Pakistan forthwith.  In particular harassment of the Supreme Court must cease, and the January parliamentary elections should be allowed to proceed without hindrance.  If these things do not happen the fight against Islamism in Pakistan may be lost by default.